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Abstract: The “New Lex Mercatoria” is not a “legal system” or a defined set of rules, but a 
“method”. In this sense, the New Lex Mercatoria consists of giving authorization to the courts and/or ar-
bitrators to assess different legal materials regulating international trade; following that, they will extract 
the “most appropriate rules” to solve the litigation. It is, therefore, a method to achieve adequate decisions 
in international trade (Method of Decision-Making). Thus, the arbitrator is prevented from applying a 
single national Law, which is exactly what the parties intended to avoid at all costs and the reason why 
they chose the New Lex Mercatoria. In other words, it can be affirmed that the methodological approach 
to the New Lex Mercatoria is the most operative, useful and complete, as well as the one that enables us 
to develop a metacriticism of the New Lex Mercatoria as a source of Law in international trade.
Keywords: Arbitration, efficiency principle, general principles of Law recognized by civilized 
Nations, general principles of private international law, Globalization, international contracts, interna-
tional trade, delocalization, mandatory rules (in international trade), New Lex Mercatoria, “Norsolor 
syndrome”, Private International Law, Public Policy, sources of Law, Uniform Law.
Resumen: La Nueva Lex Mercatoria es un “método” y no un “ordenamiento jurídico” ni un con-
junto definido de reglas. En esta acepción, la Nueva Lex Mercatoria consiste en una habilitación ofrecida 
a los tribunales y/o a los árbitros para que éstos valoren distintos materiales jurídicos reguladores del co-
mercio internacional y, tras ello, extraigan las “normas más adecuadas” para solventar el litigio. Es, por 
tanto, un método para alcanzar decisiones adecuadas en el comercio internacional (Method of Decision-
Making). De ese modo, se evita que el árbitro acabe por aplicar una concreta Ley estatal lo que cons-
tituye, significativamente, eso mismo que la elección de la Nueva Lex Mercatoria por las partes quiere 
evitar a toda costa. En otras palabras, puede afirmarse que la acepción metodológica de la Nueva Lex 
Mercatoria es la más operativa, la más útil, la más completa y la que permite desarrollar, precisamente, 
una metacrítica de la Nueva Lex Mercatoria como fuente del Derecho de los negocios internacionales.
Palabras clave: Arbitraje, comercio internacional, contratos internacionales, Derecho Internacio-
nal Privado, Derecho Uniforme, deslocalización, fuentes del Derecho, Globalización, normas impera-
tivas (en el comercio internacional), Nueva Ley Mercatoria, orden público, principios generales de De-
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I. Globalization, market and economic operators in the 21st century
1. The economic process known as “Globalization” has completely transformed the scenario 
in which enterprises operate nowadays1. The traditional idea of “national markets” has changed giving 
way to a single gigantic market, identified with the whole planet Earth. A single market in which capital 
flows fast, guided by a universal law: the production of profits. Globalization is a complex phenomenon 
formed by several structures of different characteristics; it allows the free global circulation of produc-
tive factors, information and social and cultural models. Some authors more technically define it as the 
“phenomenon of extension to the planet of social and economic interdependence”2. For J. BAsedow, it 
has to do with the fact that an increasing number of social problems show a global dimension that cannot 
be tackled with national solutions3. For G. de lA dehesA, it is a “dynamic process of increasing freedom 
and global integration of the labour, goods, services, technology and capital markets”4. 
2. Two large structures make up Globalization5. The first structure or fundamental element con-
sists of the elimination of economic and political barriers to the free circulation of productive factors. 
The second structure or element is the unprecedented technological development of physical communi-
cations and telecommunications, which allows a fluid movement of people and information, as well as 
cultural and social models around the world.
3. The final result is clear: a planetary extension of the market has taken place (= the world ope-
rates as a single market), the economic control law (= public economic law) experiences a remarkable 
downturn (= it is the crisis of Public Business Law, writes G. BroGGini)6. It is the transition from state 
capitalism to world capitalism and in this new legal and evaluative picture, capital companies with a 
cross-border dimension rise up as the vectors that drive and move wealth throughout the planet. If assets 
1  The authors wish to thank warmly Umberta Pennarolli for her help with the English version of this work.
2  M.s.M. MAhMoud, “Mondialisation et souveraineté de l'Etat”, JDI Clunet, 1996, pp. 611-662; J. ChesneAux, “Dix questions 
sur la mondialisation”, Les frontières de l'Economie globale, Le monde diplomatique, 1994, manière de voir núm. 18.
3  J. BAsedow, “The Effects of Globalization on Private International Law”, in J. BAsedow / T. Kono, Legal Aspects of Glo-
balization, The Hague - London- Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 11-26.
4  G. de lA dehesA, Comprender la globalización, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2000, p. 17.
5  h.P. MArTin / h. sChuMAnn, La trampa de la globalización (el ataque contra la democracia y el bienestar), Madrid, Ed.Taurus, 
1998, pp. 22-24.
6  G. BroGGini, “Sulle società nel diritto internazionale privato”, RDI, 1992, vol. LXXV, pp. 30-40; G. BroGGini, “Conside-
razioni sul diritto internazionale privato dell'economia”, RDIPP, 1990, pp. 277-300.
recho Internacional Privado, principios generales del Derecho reconocidos por las naciones civilizadas, 
“síndrome Norsolor”.
Sumario: I. Globalization, market and economic operators in the 21st century. II. Regulatory 
law of the international economic activity of companies. 1. A global market without a global law. 2. 
International business law created by commercial companies. A) Legal material prepared by trans-
national corporations. B) The mystery of the New Lex Mercatoria. a) The New Lex Mercatoria as 
Law developed by merchants. b) The New Lex Mercatoria as entrepreneurial class law. III. Applica-
tion of the New Lex Mercatoria by arbitrators. 1. Arbitrators are the best applicators of the New Lex 
Mercatoria. 2. The New Lex Mercatoria as a legal system. 3. Critics to the theory of the New Lex 
Mercatoria. 4. Metacritical vision of the New Lex Mercatoria as a method to resolve disputes bet-
ween companies. 5. Law applicable by arbitrators to the substance of the dispute. A) Preliminary as-
pects. B) Article VII.1 of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, made 
in Geneva on April 21, 1961. C) Art. 34.2 of Spanish Arbitration Law 60/2003.  a) Open attitude 
of the legislator toward non-national legal materials. b) Choice of the New Lex Mercatoria by the 
parties.  c) Application of the New Lex Mercatoria in the absence of a choice of law by the parties. 
IV. Concluding thoughts. New Lex Mercatoria, regulatory competence and efficiency principle.
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move across borders, so do companies, because in a way they are also assets themselves, as T. viGnAl 
points out7.
4. The current process of globalization shows new data hitherto unknown: never had the interna-
tionalization of people’s lives reached such high levels or so many countries and sectors; never had pri-
vate companies enjoyed so much economic power as they have at present; finally, never had the process 
of Globalization been supported so decidedly by transnational corporations, international institutions 
and the States8. The market has become global.
II. Regulatory law of the international economic activity of companies
1. A global market without a global law
5. Despite the unstoppable momentum of globalization, the world remains divided into almost 
200 States, each with its courts, authorities and laws that regulate economic activity. Now, this “legal par-
ticularism” does not prevent us to observe something that has been pointed out by A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA 
/ J. CArrAsCosA González9: large companies, corporations, enterprises and societies operate throughout 
the world respecting a single set of laws: the economic laws of supply and demand, of costs and benefits, 
and of free competition among economic operators. In this scenario, as f. GAlGAno has indicated with his 
usual brilliance and legal elegance, there is no “world law” that regulates the international activity of com-
mercial companies10. There is no such thing as a world government that can elaborate global legal rules to 
regulate the economic activity of companies on the planet. In fact, joint initiatives of the States to create 
such rules show very poor results. Few regulations can be described as examples of “world law”. Among 
them we may mention –even if with extreme caution– the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, made in Vienna on April 11, 1980; the Patent Cooperation Treaty, made 
in Washington on June 19, 1970; and the New York Convention of June 10, 1958 on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The substantive regulation of the exequatur of arbitral awards, 
clearly aimed at favouring the extraterritorial enforcement of arbitral awards as well as their international 
circulation, has been the key to its success. Spain joined the Convention in 1977, which entered into force 
for Spain on August 10, 197711. The NYC 1958 for Spain has an erga omnes character, thus it applies to 
the exequatur of any non-Spanish arbitration award, regardless of the country where the award was made 
(Order Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Madrid, 28 September 2016 [exequatur of award rendered in France 
against the Republic of Guinea], Order Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Catalonia, 15 May 2014 [uncon-
firmed arbitration award rendered in Paris])12. This Convention has been a thorough success because of 
the very high number of States that are parties to it: as a matter of fact, one hundred and fifty-nine as of 
April 201913. This entails a competitive advantage for the arbitral award compared to a judicial decision: 
7  T. viGnAl, “Nota a STJCE 16 diciembre 2008, Cartesio”, JDI Clunet, 2009, pp. 893-902.
8  Y. dezAlAY,  Marchands de droit: la restructuration de l’ordre juridique international par les multinationales du droit, 
Paris, Fayard, 1992; e. verdeGuer PuiG / l. AlvArez Alonso, La globalización, Madrid, Acento Editorial, 2001, pp. 10-11.
9  A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA / J. CArrAsCosA González, “El Derecho internacional privado y la actividad internacional de las 
sociedades mercantiles”, in A. Alonso / l. velAsCo / J. PulGAr (Dir.), Derecho de Sociedades y de los Mercados Financieros 
(Libro homenaje a Carmen Alonso Ledesma), Madrid, Iustel, 2018, pp. 174-196.
10  f. GAlGAno, “Globalizzazione dei mercati e universalità del diritto”, Politica del diritto, 2009-2, pp. 177-192; f. GAlGA-
no, La globalizzazione nello specchio del diritto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005.
11  BOE (Spanish Official Journal) Nº 164 11 July 1977. Vid., ad ex., A.M. BAllesTeros BArros, “La relación entre la 
Convención de Nueva York de 1958 y otros instrumentos internacionales sobre jurisdicción, reconocimiento o exequátur”, in 
A.M. lóPez rodríGuez/K. fACh GóMez (eds.), Reconocimiento y Ejecución de Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras en España y 
Latinoamérica, Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2019, pp. 135-155; A. lóPez de ArGuMedo Piñeiro, “La interpretación y aplicación 
de la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 en España”, in A.M. lóPez rodríGuez/K. fACh GóMez (eds.), Reconocimiento y 
Ejecución de Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras en España y Latinoamérica, Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2019, pp. 101-133.
12  Order Tribunal Superior de Justicia Madrid 28 September 2016 [CENDOJ 28079310012016200059]; Order Tribunal 
Superior de Justicia Catalonia 15 May 2014 [CENDOJ 08019310012014200062].
13  Vid.: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/es/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.
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an award susceptible of obtaining the exequatur under the NYC 1958 is effective practically all over the 
world, something that a court ruling issued by the courts of a certain State cannot boast of. Not even in the 
EU. Only the three normative groups mentioned above can be considered “global rules” (= in the sense of 
rules having a worldwide scope, applicable in large areas of the planet) that regulate the economic activity 
carried out by companies, and even such global rules suffer from great operational limitations.
2. International business law created by commercial companies
A) Legal material prepared by transnational corporations
6. It seems appropriate, at this point, to examine in some detail the private law created by 
transnational corporations themselves. Companies have created a body of rules that regulate their trans-
national economic activity and have done so through several large movements of active legal creation: 
the elaboration of the so-called “standard contracts” developed by parent companies, employed by the 
most large corporate groups; “uniform contracts” drawn up by international business associations in 
each sector of the economy, which companies observe as members of such associations; the technocratic 
production of uniform technical rules adopted within international organizations and/or international 
business organizations and, finally, the New Lex Mercatoria.
B) The mystery of the New Lex Mercatoria
a) The New Lex Mercatoria as Law developed by merchants
7. Companies with international activity, as well as large corporations, enterprises and corporate 
conglomerates are the undoubted key players of the large international contracts that move wealth in 
the world. Wealth moves from one country to another thanks to a great legal invention: the contract. 
International contracts are the best legal vehicles to ensure exchange between companies from different 
countries. They ensure such exchange even if there is a border between the contracting companies, 
because the contract can be enforced in several countries, as long as it is a valid contract in the country 
where it is performed, needless to say.
8. However, the regulation of contracts varies from country to country. In opposition to this 
diversity, which is detrimental to legal certainty in the international scenario, adequate legal regulation 
of international contracts requires certain and predictable responses. The contracting parties must have 
available some “rules of contractual behaviour” whose application involves reduced costs and that they 
may know ex ante, so they are able to calculate the legal consequences of their contractual behaviour. At 
present, several legal initiatives coexist for this purpose.
9. In the face of proposals for unification put forward by the States, the primary actors in inter-
national trade have developed certain “rules of behaviour” that govern in a direct and material manner 
¾and with no reference to the Law of any particular State¾ certain aspects of international contracting14. 
It is the so-called “transnational law” or New Lex Mercatoria.
10. The concept of “New Lex Mercatoria” is and always has been controversial. Very controver-
sial. A widespread definition is the classic one provided by GoldMAn: the “New Lex Mercatoria” is “the 
law proper to international economic relations”15. Another sound definition is provided by A. friGnAni: 
14  r. MiChAels/n. JAnsen, “Private Law beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization”, AJCL, 54, 2006, 
pp. 843-890.
15  B. GoldMAn, “Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria”, Archives de Philosolophie du droit, 1964, vol. 9, pp. 46-69; id., 
“La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et l'arbitrage international: réalités et perspectives, JDI Clunet, 1979, vol. 106, pp. 475508.
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the New Lex Mercatoria constitutes “a series of usages and frequent practices in international trade that 
individuals assume in their relationships with the opinio juris that they are legally binding”16. The rules 
that make up the “New Lex Mercatoria” are contained in international conventions, state laws, arbitra-
tion practices, commercial legal usages, regulations drawn up by merchants’ associations, etc.
11. It has been said that the New Lex Mercatoria is an imprecise set of more or less nebulous 
legal rules developed by large companies and imposed on the various sectors of international contracting 
because their use is very widespread in contractual practice, and, as I. sTrenGer points out, because such 
rules are applied by arbitrators who resolve disputes related to international trade17. As s.M. CArBone 
has stressed, it is the companies of transnational dimensions and not other subjects or other instances, 
which create a “new Lex Mercatoria” that expands in the 21st century as an alternative criterion to 
national Law18. The jus mercatorum is not Law created for the leading companies of the international 
trade, but Law created by these companies to regulate their activities in the international trade sector. 
Conceiving the New Lex Mercatoria as a patchwork of all legal material created by States, institutions 
or companies to regulate the activity of the latter in international trade is inaccurate, notes s. sánChez 
lorenzo19. Such a conception of the New Lex Mercatoria mixes up heteronomous law (= created by 
individuals and institutions that do not operate in international trade) and autonomous law (= created, 
precisely, by the key players of international trade themselves). Since the eighteenth century, and with 
greater impetus after Codification, Law is essentially heteronomous: it is created by the State under a 
monopoly regime. The originality, the distinctive feature of the New Lex Mercatoria ¾possibly the sou-
rce of its virtues¾ resides in the very fact that the New Lex Mercatoria is created by the same individuals 
whose commercial activity it regulates: the merchants, as h.A. GriGerA nAón has explained20. It is a 
Law that the key players of international trade give themselves. The key feature that characterizes the 
New Lex Mercatoria is that traders have created all the materials that make it up in order to regulate the 
contracts of international commerce. It is a “Corporate Law” of sorts.
12. The legal materials not elaborated by the merchants, but by States or official institutions are 
not part of the New Lex Mercatoria unless, as s. sánChez lorenzo correctly points out, they result in an 
“objectification” of the customs and usages previously created by the Companies that operate in interna-
tional trade21. As a result, Incoterms 2010, effective as of January 2, 2011, drawn up by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to regulate certain rights and obligations in the contract for the interna-
tional sale of goods, are part of the New Lex Mercatoria. The same applies to the “Uniformed Customs 
and Practice for Documentary Credits” (latest version 2006) ¾also prepared by the ICC¾, that regulate 
certain aspects related to payment in international sales agreements, but only to the extent that the ICC 
has collected the Law that entrepreneurs and merchants had been putting in practice. It should be empha-
sized that it is the ICC, not UNCITRAL that has elaborated these rules. UNCITRAL merely “supports” 
the use of such rules. On the other hand, the Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Contracts 
(1994), which have been updated several times, most recently in 201622, are not part of the New Lex 
16  A. friGnAni, “Il contratto internazionale”, Trattato di diritto commerciale e diritto pubblico dell'economia, Milán, Ce-
dam, 1990, pp. 86-90; A. friGnAni, Il diritto del commercio internazionale, Milán, IPSOA informática, 1986, p. 101.
17  i. sTrenGer, “La notion de lex mercatoria en droit du commerce international”, RCADI, 1991, t. 227, pp. 207-356.
18  s.M. CArBone, “Lex Mercatoria e lex societatis tra principi di diritto internazionale privato e disciplina dei mercati finan-
ziari”, RDIPP, 2007, pp. 27-62; s.M. CArBone, “Patti parasociali, autonomia privata e diritto internazionale privato”, RDIPP, 
1991, pp. 885-894.
19  s. sánChez lorenzo, “Derecho aplicable al fondo de la controversia en el arbitraje comercial internacional”, REDI, LXI, 
1, 2009, pp. 39-74.
20  h.A. GriGerA nAon, “Choice-of-Law Problems in international commercial arbitration”, RCADI, 2001, vol. 289, pp. 
9-396, esp. pp. 31-34.
21  s. sánChez lorenzo, “Derecho aplicable al fondo de la controversia en el arbitraje comercial internacional”, REDI, LXI, 
1, 2009, pp. 39-74.
22  Vid., ad ex., e.J. BröderMAnn, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: An Article-by-Article 
Commentary, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2018; P. deuMier, “Les principes Unidroit comme cadre de référen-
ce pour l’interprétation uniforme des droits nationaux”, RIDC, 2019, nº 2, pp. 413-430; A. Muñoz/d. GenY, “Les principes 
d'UNIDROIT dans l'arbitrage international”, Revue de droit des affaires internationales, 2016, nº 2, pp. 109-117; M.P. PerAles 
Lex Mercatoria and private international arbitrationAlfonso-luis CAlvo / JAvier CArrAsCosA
71Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Marzo 2020), Vol. 12, Nº 1, pp. 66-85
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2020.5180
Mercatoria with the exception of a handful of specific provisions which are a blend of the customs and 
practices of the merchants23. It is known that these “Principles” have been mostly drawn up by experts 
in law coming from the Roman-continental sector and, for that reason, they are not an expression of the 
Jus mercatorum24. Due to the above, the New Lex Mercatoria has been accused of being an expression 
of “Professors’ law” (Jus Professorum) and not merchants’ Law (Jus mercatorum)25. It has been pointed 
out that many of the legal rules that make up the New Lex Mercatoria have not been drawn up by mer-
chants, but by the States. In fact, when experts in international trade relationships say, for example, that 
CISG 1980 contains rules of the New Lex Mercatoria, they incur a profound contradiction: in that case, 
the rules do not belong to the New Lex Mercatoria, but to national law, because the CISG is part of the 
law of the States parties to such international agreement, as A. KAssis notes26.
b) The New Lex Mercatoria as entrepreneurial class Law.
13. The so-called transnational law, the New Lex Mercatoria, having been created by internatio-
nal trade professionals as a result of their private initiative, is not a neutral law. Its rules tend to reflect the 
interests and will of the large multinational corporations, which are the ones that elaborate the principles 
and provisions that make up this transnational law. Therefore, allowing the choice of transnational law 
as a contract law does not constitute an efficient solution for many entrepreneurs and individuals who, 
without being large corporations, also operate in international trade. And neither is it for States, which 
do not want to lose control over the legal rules applicable to international contracts.
III. Application of the New Lex Mercatoria by arbitrators
1. Arbitrators are the best applicators of the New Lex Mercatoria
14. The actual functionality of the New Lex Mercatoria depends on the circumstances in which 
it is applied. Disputes and controversies between companies can either be resolved by the courts of a 
State, or by means of private international arbitration. Now, when it is up to the courts to resolve such 
disputes, they will apply the rules of the New Lex Mercatoria only to the extent that their state Law 
allows it. Such Law allows the application of materials that are part of the New Lex Mercatoria through 
two different channels: (a) Through “material autonomy” of the contracting parties27. The rules of the 
visCAsillAs, “La aplicación jurisprudencial de los principios de UNIDROIT”, in l.M. MirAndA serrAno/JAvier PAGAdor lóPez 
(eds.), Retos y tendencias del Derecho de la contratación mercantil, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2017, pp. 807-824; s. sánChez 
lorenzo, “UNIDROIT principles and OHADAC principles on international commercial contracts: convergences and divergen-
ces”, in s. leiBle/r. Miquel sAlA (eds.), Legal integration in Europe and America: international contract law and ADR, Jena, 
JWV Jenaer Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 2018, pp. 69-106.
23  M. GAllArdo sAlA, “Os princípios propostos pelo Unidroit: relação com a lex mercatoria e sua utilização na esfera do 
comércio internacional”, Revista do IBRAC, 21, 25, 2016, pp. 241-273.
24  https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2016/principles2016-e.pdf.
25  A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA / J. CArrAsCosA González, “Contrato internacional, nueva Lex Mercatoria y Principios Unidroit 
sobre los contratos comerciales internacionales”, in Estudios Jurídicos en homenaje al Profesor Luis Díez-Picazo, vol. II, Madrid, 
Civitas, 2003, pp. 1539-1567; A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA / J. CArrAsCosA González, “Los contratos internacionales y el mito de la 
Nueva Lex Mercatoria”, in A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA / J. CArrAsCosA González (Dirs.), Estudios sobre Contratación Internacional, 
Madrid, Colex, 2006, pp. 55-80; A. leduC, “L’émergence d’une nouvelle lex mercatoria à l’enseigne des principes d’UNIDROIT 
relatifs aux contrats du commerce international: thèse et antithèse”, Revue Juridique Thémis, 35, 2001, pp. 429-451.
26  A. KAssis, Le nouveau droit européen des contrats internationaux, Paris, LGDJ, 1993, pp. 99-101; A. KAssis, Théorie 
générale des usages du commerce (droit comparé, contrats et arbitrales internationaux, lex mercatoria), Paris, Pichon & Du-
rand-Auzias, 1984.
27  e. CAsTellAnos ruiz, “Lex Mercatoria y autonomía privada en materia de contratos internacionales” en A.l. CAlvo 
CArAvACA/J. oviedo AlBán (eds.), Nueva Lex Mercatoria y contratos internacionales, Bogotá D.C., Grupo Editorial Ibáñez, 
2006, pp. 55-117; s. PATTi, “Autonomia negoziale nei codici civili europei e nei contratti transnazionali”, in Liber amicorum 
Angelo Davì: La vita giuridica internazionale nell’età della globalizzazione, vol. I, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2019, pp. 
271-280.
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New Lex Mercatoria are considered substantial “private agreements” and will be applied to the contract 
insofar as the Law that governs it considers that such inter partes private agreements made under the 
New Lex Mercatoria are valid (e.g., for Spain, article 1255 CC); (b) By accepting the “legal nature” of 
certain rules of the New Lex Mercatoria. On very specific occasions, certain rules of the New Lex Mer-
catoria are “raised” by some rules of private international law to an “objective” legal rank. They become 
“objective law” rules. Examples: art. 9 CISG28 and art. 25 BR I-bis29.
15. However, it is only when litigation is resolved by arbitration bodies that the New Lex Mer-
catoria can deploy its broader normative and regulatory potential. In international practice, it is very 
common for contracting parties to invest arbitration bodies with the competence to resolve disputes ari-
sing from an international contract. More than 80% of international contracts have an arbitration clause 
in favour of private law international arbitration, as f. MArrellA stresses30. Concretizing the rules (= 
the “conflict solving criteria or guidelines”) that the arbitrators will apply to the international contract 
becomes, then, a matter of the utmost importance.
16. At a contentious arbitration level, it must be kept in mind that the competence of the arbi-
trators emanates from the parties. In the case of arbitration subject to Law, it must be kept in mind that 
the arbitrators are not “guardians” of any state legal system (A. reMiro BroTóns)31. Therefore, the arbi-
trators will resolve the dispute according to the “rules” that the parties indicate as the normative basis. 
The parties may direct the arbitrators to rule under a non-state regulation (“droit non étatique”) ¾as P. 
lAGArde / A. TenenBAuM indicate¾ provided that the rules governing the arbitration in the State where 
it is carried out admit the designation of the New Lex Mercatoria as the law regulating the contract (o. 
lAndo / P.A. nielsen), as it is the case in Spain32. The arbitrators apply those rules of the New Lex Mer-
catoria that are indicated by the parties.
17. In this context, the arbitrators can resolve the controversy by applying rules of the New Lex 
Mercatoria. The arbitrators have no reason to apply any State Law or any principle of any non-existent 
“transnational public order”33, so be it. If any of the parties urges the public authorities to enforce an ar-
bitral award by means of which a dispute has been resolved without applying any State Law, it will result 
that said state authorities are not allowed to control the “Law applied by the arbitrators” and the award 
will be enforced. However, several caveats are required: (a) If the award infringes the basic principles of 
the State law of the country of execution, it will not be performed because it violates the “international 
28  Vid., ad ex., A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA, “Artículo 9”, in luis díez-PiCAzo Y PonCe de león (Dir.), La compraventa in-
ternacional de mercaderías. Comentario de la Convención de Viena, Madrid, Editorial Civitas, S.A., 1998, pp. 132-144; P. 
MAnKowsKi, “Article 9 CISG”, in P. MAnKowsKi (ed.), Commercial Law: Article-by-Article Commentary, Baden-Baden, No-
mos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2019, pp. 47-51.
29  Vid., ad ex., A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA/J. CArrAsCosA González, “El foro de la sumisión expresa”, in A.-l. CAlvo 
CArAvACA/J. CArrAsCosA González/C. CAAMiñA doMínGuez, Litigación internacional en la Unión Europea I. Competencia 
judicial y validez de resoluciones en materia civil y mercantil en la Unión Europea. Comentario al Reglamento Bruselas I Bis, 
Cizur Menor, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2017, pp. 221-264 (pp. 240-242); u. MAGnus, “Article 25”, in European Commen-
taries on Private International Law ECPIL, vol. I (Brussels Ibis Regulation), Köln, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG, 2016, pp. 
584-669 (pp. 645-651).
30  f. MArrellA, La nuova Lex Mercatoria, Padova, Cedam, 2003, pp. 33-39.
31  A. reMiro BroTóns, “Reglas de conflicto y normas materiales de Derecho internacional privado”, Temis (Symbolae 
García Arias), Nº 33-36, 1973/1974, pp. 605-646.
32  P. lAGArde / A. TenenBAuM, “De la convention de Rome au règlement Rome I”, RCDIP, 2008, pp. 727-780;  P.A. nielsen 
/ o. lAndo, “The Rome I Regulation”, CMLR, 2008, pp. 1687-1725.
33  l. ChedlY,  L’ arbitrage commercial international & ordre public transnational, Tunis, Centre de Publ. Univ., 2002; P. 
lAlive, “Ordre public transnational (ou réellement international) et l’arbitrage international”, Revue de l’arbitrage, 1986, pp. 
329-373; id., “L’ordre public transnational et l’arbitre international”, in G. venTurini/s. BAriATTi (eds.), Nuovi strumenti del 
diritto internazionale privato: Liber Fausto Pocar, Milano, Giuffrrè Editore, 2009, pp. 599-611; f. lATTY, “L’ordre public sans 
l’Etat (quelques remarques sur un oxymore en trompe-l’oeil)”, in C.A. duBreuil (dir.), L’ordre public, Paris, Cujas, 2013, pp. 
21-31; f. MeGerlin, Ordre public transnational et arbitrage international de droit privé: Essai critique sur la méthode, Paris, 
Atelier National de Reproduction des Thèses - A.N.R.T., 2003.
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public policy” of that country34; (b) In addition, the award may also be attacked before the state authori-
ties by an appeal for nullity or annulment on the same ground (Judgment ECJ June 1, 1999, Swiss China, 
and Judgment ECJ March 23, 1982, 102/81, Nordsee)35.
2. The New Lex Mercatoria as a legal system
18. Actually, the controversy regarding the concept of “New Lex Mercatoria” is a controversy 
that affects its functions. In such scenario, there are various “approaches” to the “New Lex Mercatoria”, 
well illustrated by authoritative academic literature36.
The “New Lex Mercatoria” traditional approach argues that the rules that make it up merely 
regulate a few aspects of international contracting. Thus, the contract is governed by a national law; 
however, some of the international usages and practices developed by transnational traders may also be 
applicable (C. sChMiTThoff)37. 
The the “New Lex Mercatoria” progressive approach, i.e. the true theory about the “New Lex 
Mercatoria”, indicates that in the real world, it functions as a veritable legal system, as it has been ex-
tensively shown by the academic literature38: in fact, it competes with national Laws, it can regulate an 
34  M.A. CeBrián sAlvAT, “La excepción de orden público internacional de la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 y los 
tribunales españoles”, en A.M. lóPez rodríGuez/K. fACh GóMez (eds.), Reconocimiento y Ejecución de Sentencias Arbitrales 
Extranjeras en España y Latinoamérica, Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2019, pp. 263-284; P. MAYer, “La sentence contraire à 
l'ordre public au fond”, Revue de l' arbitrage, 1994, n° 4, pp. 615-652; P. MAYer/A. shePPArd, “Final ILA Report on Public 
Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards”, Arbitration International, 19, 2, 2003, pp. 249-263; J.A. 
Pérez Beviá, “Algunas consideraciones sobre el árbitro y el orden público en el arbitraje privado internacional”, Revista de la 
Corte Española de Arbitraje, 6, 1990, pp. 81-99; J.-B. rACine, L'arbitrage commercial international et l'ordre public, Paris, 
LGDJ, 1999.
35  Judgment ECJ 1 June 1999, C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd vs. Benetton International NV., Rec., 1999, p. I-03055, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:269; Judgment ECJ 23 March 1982, C-102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei 
Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG and Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:107.
36  J. BAsedow, “Lex mercatoria e diritto internazionale privato dei contratti: una prospettiva economica”, in Liber Fausto 
Pocar, vol. 2, Milano, Giuffrè, 2009, pp. 55-74; K.P. BerGer, Formalisierte oder “schleichende” Kodifizierung des transnatio-
nalen Wirtschaftsrechts: zu den methodischen und praktischen Grundlagen der lex mercatoria, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1996; id., 
The creeping codification of the new lex mercatoria, 2ª ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2010; K.P. BerGer 
(ed.), The practice of transnational law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001; M. CándAno Pérez, “La unificación del 
derecho comercial internacional: nueva lex mercatoria como alternativa al derecho estatal”, Revista Prolegómenos. Derechos 
y Valores de la Facultad de Derecho, 21, 41, 2018, pp. 150-162; G. CuniBerTi, “Three theories of Lex Mercatoria”, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 52, 2, 2014, pp. 369-434; id., “La Lex Mercatoria au XXI siècle. Une analyse empirique et 
économique”, JDI Clunet, 2016, 3, pp. 765-780; n. horn, “Transnationales Handelsrecht: zur Normqualität der lex merca-
toria”, en Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt zum 70. Geburtstag, Köln, O. Schmidt, 2009, pp. 705-724; l. lonGhi, “Il nuovo 
diritto globale: lex mercatoria o ius gentium?”, Rassegna di diritto pubblico europeo, Anno XV, n. 2, 2016, pp. 137-149; M.A. 
PeTsChe, “The application of transnational law (lex mercatoria) by domestic courts”, Journal of Private International Law, 10, 
3, 2014, pp. 489-515; J.A. silvA (Coord.), Estudios sobre lex mercatoria. Una realidad internacional, 2ª ed., México, UNAM, 
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2013; o. ToTh, The lex mercatoria in theory and practice, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2017; M. virGós soriAno, “Lex Mercatoria”, en Enciclopedia Jurídica Básica, Madrid, Civitas, 1995, pp. 3992-3994; 
id., “Obligaciones contractuales” in J.d. González CAMPos eT Al., Derecho internacional privado, parte especial, 6ª ed. rev., 
Madrid, Eurolex, 1995, pp. 143-208; id., “El Convenio arbitral en el arbitraje internacional”, Actualidad Jurídica Uría Menén-
dez, n.º 14, 2006, pp. 13-28; id., “Arbitraje comercial internacional y Convenio de Nueva York de 1958”, La Ley, nº 6679 (26 
de marzo de 2007), pp. 1-5.
37  C.M. sChMiTThoff, “International Trade and Private International Law”, Von Deutschen zum Europäischen Recht. Fest-
schrift für H.Dölle, vol. II, Tübingen, Mohr, 1963, pp. 261-280; C.M. sChMiTThoff, “The Limits of Party Autonomy”, in C.J. 
ChenG (Ed.), Clive M.Schmitthoff's Select Essays on International Trade Law, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Nijhoff, 1988, pp. 
584-595; h. wulferT-MArKerT, Clive M. Schmitthoffs Konzeption eines transnationalen Welthandelsrechts: ein Beitrag zum 
Leben und Werk von Clive M. Schmitthoff (1903-1990), Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2018.
38  u. drAeTTA, Il diritto dei contratti internazionali, Padova, Cedam, 1984; s.M. CArBone, “Il 'contratto senza legge' e la 
convenzione di Roma del 1980”, RDIPP, 1983, vol. XIX, pp. 279287; s.M. CArBone, “L'autonomia privata nel diritto interna-
zionale privato delle obbligazioni”, DCSI, 1982, pp. 15-38; s.M. CArBone, “L'autonomia privata nei rapporti economici inter-
nazionali ed i suoi limiti”, RDIPP, 2007, pp. 891-920; s.M. CArBone, “Autonomia privata nel diritto sostanziale e nel diritto 
internazionale privato: diverse tecniche e un'unica funzione”, RDIPP, 2013, vol. 49, núm. 3, pp. 569-592; f.K. JuenGer, “The 
lex mercatoria and private international law”, Unif. Law Review, 2000-I, pp. 171-187.
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international contract without the help or interference of any State Law, and it allows parties to litigate 
on the basis of a legal system that does not correspond to the national law of any of the contracting par-
ties in particular. Thus, if litigation arises, no contracting party “is playing at home” because “their” law 
governs the contract, while the other party “is playing away” because he has to litigate in accordance 
with the Law of the “other contracting party”  (o. lAndo / P.A. nielsen)39. This is the true “theory of the 
New Lex Mercatoria”.
3. Critics to the theory of the New Lex Mercatoria
19. The well-known “theory of the New Lex Mercatoria”, which corresponds to the “progressive 
approach”, is characterized by the following data and elements
In the first place, the New Lex Mercatoria is conceived as a true “legal system”, alternative to 
the Law of the States. The new Lex Mercatoria does not need the help of State Laws; it is self-reliant in 
regulating international contracts. If in the early Middle Ages there was a Lex Mercatoria, a law that re-
gulated international trade and operated independently of State Laws, now there is a New Lex Mercatoria.
Secondly, international trade operators ¾the Societas Mercatorum or Business Community¾ 
operate as a “private international legislator” completely apart from national legislators and parlia-
ments40. The merchants, and especially the most powerful merchants, the Big Corporations of the 21st 
century, are the creators of the transnational law that governs international contracting41. In the 21st 
century, the legislator legislates in English and his name is “entrepreneurial class”, writes F. GAlGAno42.
Thirdly, the New Lex Mercatoria features contents of three different kinds (Y. derAins)43: (a) 
General Principles of Law regarding international commercial relationships44. The most important, 
as J.d.M. lew / l.A. MisTelis / s.M. Kröll and l. MusTil have pointed out, are the following: pac-
ta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus, non-enforceability of unfair terms; culpa in contrahendo in 
contractual negotiations, performance of the contract in good faith, invalidity of contracts whose object 
is illegal or made through bribery, duty to negotiate the contract in good faith; exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus, the court is not bound by the qualification that the parties give to the contract; actor incum-
bit probatio, limitation of damages arising from breach of contract that include both actual damage and 
loss of profits, the party that suffers the breach of contract can take measures to reduce the damage, 
calculation of damages for non-delivery of goods made on the basis of market prices, interpretation of 
the contract aimed at giving an effective sense to its terms, etc.45; (b) Uniform customs and practices 
observed in international trade practice46. Many of such customs and practices have been compiled by 
certain associations that intervene in international trade. Examples: the “Uniform Customs and Practice 
for Documentary Credits”, whose latest version dates of 2006, the “Uniform Rules for Collection of 
Documents”, or Incoterms 2010, all of them drawn up by the International Chamber of Commerce; (c) 
Rules produced by arbitrators in international trade. Arbitrators usually refer to certain “precedents” 
established on previous occasions by the arbitration practice (stare decisis) 47.
39  P.A. nielsen / o. lAndo, “The Rome I Regulation”, CMLR, 2008, pp. 1687-1725.
40  P. KAhn, “Les principes généraux du droit devant les arbitres du commerce international”, JDI Clunet, 1989, vol. 116, pp. 
305327; f. fouChArd, L'arbitrage commerciale international, París, Dalloz, 1965, pp. 89-91; f. GAlGAno, La globalizzazione 
nello specchio del diritto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005.
41  J. hernández zuBizArreTA/P. rAMiro, Contra la “Lex Mercatoria”: propuestas y alternativas para desmantelar el poder 
de las empresas transnacionales, Barcelona, Icaria, 2015.
42  f. GAlGAno, “Globalizzazione dei mercati e universalità del diritto”, Politica del diritto, 2009-2, pp. 177-192.
43  Y. derAins, “Les tendances de la jurisprudence arbitrale internationale”, JDI Clunet, 1993, pp. 829-856.
44  e. GAillArd, “Treinte ans de Lex Mercatoria. Pour une application sélective de la méthode des principes généraux du 
Droit”, JDI Clunet, 122, 1995, pp. 5-30.
45  J.d.M. lew / l.A. MisTelis / s.M. Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, The Hague / London / 
New York, Kluwer, 2003, p. 454 and pp. 258-240.
46  e. MAzzoleTTi, “Gli usi contrattuali e la nuova lex mercatoria”, Giurisprudenza commerciale, 34.4, 2007, parte I, pp. 
519-548.
47  Y. dezAlAY & B.G. GArTh, Dealing in virtue: international commercial arbitration and the construction of a transnational 
legal order, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996; J.M. JACqueT, “Avons-nous besoin d’une jurisprudence arbitrale?”, 
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20. The theory of the “New Lex Mercatoria” has been unmercifully criticized for different rea-
sons, invoked by an important sector of academic literature. It has been condemned for representing a 
heterodox perspective that questions the monopoly of the State in normative production.
21. In the first place, it has been said that the New Lex Mercatoria is not “objective law”. The 
merchants who create the New Lex Mercatoria are not “legislators”, as M. virGós soriAno recalls48. 
Therefore, the rules developed by merchants are not “objective law”. The New Lex Mercatoria is not 
part of the State’s sources of law.
22. Secondly, the New Lex Mercatoria is not a real “legal system”, for several reasons intertwi-
ned with one another and very well exposed by C.w.o. sToeCKer49. There is not a single and unique Lex 
Mercatoria; there are, as P. lAGArde notes, several Leges Mercatoriae: different sets of rules that are 
valid for oil contracts, construction contracts, contracts for the purchase of raw materials, etc. These rules 
are different and only casually related with one another. It has also been indicated that the New Lex Mer-
catoria constitutes a compendium of rules, oftentimes fragmentary, that exclusively govern some very 
specific aspects of certain international contracts50. In particular, the New Lex Mercatoria is accused of 
being conceived on the basis of and very much focused on the international sale of goods, without taking 
into account the features of other contracts that are also quite common in international trade (P. KAhn)51. 
Moreover, the New Lex Mercatoria has numerous loopholes (R. dAvid), so much so that it is rare that an 
international contract is regulated exclusively by it. When it is said that arbitrators have resolved a case 
exclusively on the basis of the New Lex Mercatoria, the truth is that the arbitrators have deduced the con-
tent of such New Lex Mercatoria from the national Laws connected with the case (ICC award October 
26, 1979, n.3131, Palbak vs. Norsolor, Judgment Corte di Cassazione, Italy February 8, 1982, Judgment 
Cour de Cassation, France October 22, 1991, Valenciana), or have simply decided ex aequo et bono.
The New Lex Mercatoria has been accused of being “made up Law”, as reported by o. lAndo52. 
The risk that the arbitrators “make up” the rule they are applying and they maintain that such rule be-
longs to the New Lex Mercatoria in its progressive interpretation is no little risk (P. MAYer / v. heuzé)53. 
It is clear that arbitrators do not have legal power to “invent a legal system” that gives the agreement the 
value of a contract (= arbitrators cannot “create a legal system”, as they lack “constituent power” of a 
hypothetical legal system called “New Lex Mercatoria”), as M. virGós soriAno indicates54. On the other 
hand, not even the parties to the contract, the companies, invest the arbitrators of the power to create rules 
to resolve their disputes. As A. GiArdinA explains, the parties grant the arbitrators the power to apply the 
existing New Lex Mercatoria, not to invent new rules for the New Lex Mercatoria to settle their disputes, 
as this would be extremely unsafe for the parties55. The New Lex Mercatoria does not constitute case law 
either. Some authors ¾it is the case of r. dAvid¾ have maintained the idea that the New Lex Mercatoria 
Revue de l’arbitrage, 2010, nº 3, pp. 445-467; u. liuKKunen, “Lex mercatoria in international arbitration”, in J. KlABBers/T. 
PiiPArinen (eds.), Normative pluralism and international law: exploring global governance, New York, N.Y, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2013, pp. 201-228; h.-P. sChroeder, Die lex mercatoria arbitralis: strukturelle Transnationalität und transnationale 
Rechtsstrukturen im Recht der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, München, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2007.
48   M. virGós soriAno, “Lex Mercatoria”, Enciclopedia Jurídica Básica, Madrid, Civitas, 1995, pp. 3992-3994.
49  C.w.o. sToeCKer, “The lex mercatoria: To what extent does it exist?”, J.Int.Arb., 1990, pp. 101-126.
50  f. riGAux, “Droit économique et conflits de souverainetés”, RabelsZ, 1988, pp. 104-156; f. riGAux, “Examen de quelques 
questions laissées ouvertes par la convention de Rome sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles”, Cahiers de droit 
européen, 1988, vol. XXIV, pp. 306-321.
51  P. KAhn, “Les principes généraux du droit devant les arbitres du commerce international”, JDI Clunet, 1989, pp. 305-327.
52  o. lAndo, “The lex mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration”, ICLQ, vol. 34, 1985, pp. 747768; o. lAndo, 
“Lex mercatoria 1985-1996”, en Festskrift till Stig Strömholm, II, Uppsala, Iustus Förl., 1997, pp. 567-584.
53  P. MAYer / v. heuzé, Droit international privé, 11ª ed., Issy-les-Moulineaux, LGDJ Lextenso Éd., 2014, pp. 520-521; A. 
reMiro BroTóns, “Reglas de conflicto y normas materiales de Derecho internacional privado”, Temis (Symbolae García Arias), 
núms. 33-36, 1973/1974, pp. 605-646.
54  M. virGós soriAno, “Lex Mercatoria”, Enciclopedia Jurídica Básica, Madrid, Civitas, 1995, pp. 3992-3994.
55  A. GiArdinA, “La Lex mercatoria et la sécurité du commerce et des investissements internationaux”, Nouveaux itiné-
raires en droit: hommage à François Rigaux, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1993, pp. 223-234; id., “La lex mercatoria e la certezza del 
diritto nei commerci e negli investimenti internazionali”, RDIPP, 1992, pp. 461-470.
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constitutes a set of normative usages or customs56. However, the proliferation of arbitration bodies that 
follow different criteria as well as the limited publicity of their awards are factors that make it impossible 
to consolidate legal rules as “trade usages” or “internationally observed customs”, as G. KeGel observes57. 
23. Thirdly, it has also been pointed out that the New Lex Mercatoria lacks a true and effective 
sanctioning system. The presumed sanctions of the New Lex Mercatoria, such as boycott among mer-
chants or the expulsion from a specific market of the merchant who does not abide by the “New Lex 
Mercatoria”, are more apparent than real, as f. riGAux observes58. Although such factual sanctions can 
sometimes be very effective, they lack an imperative coercive apparatus of their own; besides, they can-
not always be applied effectively.
24. Finally, to refine and adjust the tenor of criticism, it seems appropriate to recall the words 
P. MAnKowsKi: “the so-called lex mercatoria is and will ever be a mere pseudo-law, an amorphous 
phenomenon with unclear contents and of extremely dubitable quality”59. Reams and reams written by 
the most prestigious specialists in Lex mercatoria have not achieved that the international trade practice 
back up the universal and seamless application of the new lex mercatoria to international contracts. 
4. Metacritical vision of the New Lex Mercatoria as a method to resolve disputes between companies
25. The above criticism notwithstanding, at this point it seems appropriate to make a metacriti-
cism of the theory of the New Lex Mercatoria. The object of such metacriticism is to prove that, with the 
appropriate nuances, the New Lex Mercatoria constitutes a set of normative elements that is extremely 
useful in solving international trade disputes between companies of cross-border dimensions.
26. In this perspective, there exists a methodological approach to the “New Lex Mercatoria”: 
some authors maintain that the “New Lex Mercatoria” is not a “legal system” or a defined set of rules, 
but a “method”. In this sense, the New Lex Mercatoria consists of giving authorization to the courts and/
or arbitrators to assess different legal materials regulating international trade; following that, they will 
extract the “most appropriate rules” to solve the litigation, as M. GóMez Jene has explained very well60. 
It is, therefore, a method to achieve adequate decisions in international trade (Method of Decision-Ma-
king). As the aforementioned author points out, this seems to be the approach followed by the Spanish 
legislator, since the preamble of the Spanish Arbitration Law states (VII) that “... in some cases it will be 
necessary to apply rules of several legal systems, or common rules of international trade...”. Thus, as e. 
GAillArd states, the arbitrator is prevented from applying a single national Law, which is exactly what 
the parties intended to avoid at all costs and the reason why they chose the New Lex Mercatoria61. In 
other words, it can be affirmed that the methodological approach to the New Lex Mercatoria is the most 
operative, useful and complete, as well as the one that enables us to develop a metacriticism of the New 
Lex Mercatoria as a source of Law in international trade.
56  r. dAvid, “Il Diritto del commercio internazionale, un nuovo compito per i legislatori nazionali o una nuova lex merca-
toria?”, Rivista di Diritto civile, 1976, pp. 577-598; id., L'arbitrage dans le commerce international, Paris, Economica, 1982, 
pp. 106-116.
57  G. KeGel, “Introduction to Private International Law”, IECL, 1986; id., “Fundamental Approaches”, IECL, 1986.
58  f. riGAux, “Examen de quelques questions laissées ouvertes par la convention de Rome sur la loi applicable aux obligations 
contractuelles”, Cah.DE, 1988, vol. XXIV, pp. 306-321.
59  P. MAnKowsKi, “The role of party autonomy in the allocation of jurisdiction in contractual matters”, en f. ferrAri/f. 
rAGno (ed.), Cross-border litigation in Europe: the Brussels I Recast Regulation as a panacea?, Padova, CEDAM, 2015, pp. 
97-125; P. MAnKowsKi / u. MAGnus [Eds.], Rome I Regulation: commentary, Köln, O. Schmidt, Sellier European Law Publi-
shers, 2017; P. MAnKowsKi, “Just how free is a free choice of law in contract in the EU?”, Journal of Private International Law, 
vol. 13, 2017, pp. 231-258.
60  M. GóMez Jene, Arbitraje comercial internacional, Madrid, Ed. Civitas, 2018, pp. 331-341.
61  e. GAillArd, Aspects philosophiques du droit de l'arbitrage international, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2008, pp. 152-188.
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5. Law applicable by arbitrators to the substance of the dispute
A) Preliminary aspects
27. The arbitration proceedings come to an end when the institution that has heard the case 
renders the award or arbitration ruling that resolves the differences between the parties. The arbitral 
award constitutes a legal response to the claims of those who resorted to arbitration. The most relevant 
issue of the legal regime of the arbitral award is the determination of the law or rules that the arbitrators 
must apply to resolve, in the arbitral award, the merits of the matter submitted to arbitration, which will 
oftentimes be an international contract.
28. International commercial arbitration can either be an equity arbitration (ex aequo et bono), 
or an arbitration subject to Law. In the first case, the arbitrators offer a solution built on the “justice of 
the specific case”, on equity, dissociated from any specific national legal system. In the arbitration sub-
ject to Law, on the contrary, first of all it is necessary to determine the applicable Law to the merits of 
the controversy that the arbitrators will resolve in the arbitral award. This matter has been the object of 
a long polemic within the doctrine that has come to be considered a classic. The opposing positions can 
be basically synthesized as follows:
29. Some experts argue that the law applicable to the substance of the case must be chosen by 
means of a conflict rule, which will define the national law that the arbitrators must apply. On the other 
hand, however, other specialists argue that the legal regime applicable to the merits of the dispute must 
be established through special material rules designed for international business, with no reference to 
any national law. The issue is addressed by the Geneva Convention 1961 and, in cases not falling into 
its scope, by art. 34 of the Spanish Arbitration Law 2003; moreover, it has been carefully studied by 
academic literature62.
62  About the law to be applied by the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute, D. BaBić, “Rome I Regulation: binding 
authority for arbitral tribunals in the European Union?”, Journal of Private International Law, vol. 13, 2017, pp. 71-90; h. 
BATiffol, “L'arbitrage et les conflits de lois”, Rev.Arb., 1957, pp. 110- 112; n. BlACKABY/C. PArTAsides, Redfern and Hunter 
on International Arbitration: Student Version, 6th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 185-225; G.A. BerMAnn, 
“Mandatory rules of law in international arbitration”, in f. ferrAri/s. Kröll (eds.), Conflict of laws in international arbitration, 
München, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2011, pp. 325-340; J. BeulKer, Die Eingriffsnormenproblematik in internationalen 
Schiedsverfahren: Parallelen und Besonderheiten im Vergleich zur staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2005; 
K. Boele-woelKi, “Party Autonomy in Litigation and Arbitration in View of The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts”, RCADI, 2016, t. 379, pp. 35 y ss.; f. BorToloTTi/P. MAYer (eds.), The application of substantive 
law by international arbitrators: proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the ICC Institute, held on December 5, 2013, Paris, 
International Chamber of Commerce, 2014; P. MAnKowsKi, “Schiedsgerichte und die Rom I-VO”, RIW, 64, 1-2, 2018, pp. 1-19; 
P.A. de MiGuel Asensio, “The Rome I and Rome II Regulations in International Commercial Arbitration”, in f. ferrAri (ed.), 
The Impact of EU Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Huntington, New York, Juris, 2017, pp. 177-243; id., “Eficacia 
de los Reglamentos Roma I y Roma II en el arbitraje comercial”, in Le Droit à l’épreuve des siècles et des frontières: Mélanges 
en l’honneur du Professeur Bertrand Ancel, Paris, Madrid, LGDJ, Iprolex, 2018, pp. 489-520; f. eiseMAnn, “La lex fori de 
l'arbitrage commercial international”, TCFDIP, 1973-1975, Paris, Dalloz, 1977, pp. 189-213; h.A. GriGerA nAon, Choice-of-
law problems in international commercial arbitration. The law applicable to the substance of arbitral dispute, Tübingen, 1992; 
h.A. GriGerA nAon, “Choice-of-Law Problems in international commercial arbitration”, RCADI, 2001, vol. 289, pp. 9-396; d. 
hoChsTrAsser, “Choice of Law and Foreign Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration”, J.Int.Arb., 1994, pp. 57-86; P. KAhn, 
“Les príncipes généraux du droit devant les arbitres du commerce international”, JDI Clunet, 1989, pp. 305-327; A. leAndro, 
“Qualche riflessione sul rinvio nell’arbitrato commerciale internazionale”, in Liber amicorum Angelo Davì: La vita giuridica 
internazionale nell’età della globalizzazione, vol. III, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2019, pp. 1881-1895; M. MArTineK, “Reflec-
tions on the choice of law in international commercial arbitration proceedings”, in Mélanges en l'honneur du professeur Claude 
Wiltz, Paris, LexisNexis, 2018, pp. 597-624; P. MAYer, “Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration”, Arbitration 
International, 2, 4, 1986, pp. 274-293; J.A. Moreno rodríGuez, Derecho aplicable y arbitraje internacional, Cizur Menor, Aran-
zadi, 2014; M.l. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 3th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2017, pp. 63-89; A.-s. PAPeil, “Conflict of overriding mandatory rules in arbitration”, in f. ferrAri/s. Kröll 
(eds.), Conflict of laws in international arbitration, München, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2011, pp. 341-378; J.A. Pérez 
Beviá, “Sobre la ley aplicable por el árbitro al fondo de la controversia en el DIPr. español”, RCEA, 1988-89, pp. 213-233; J.C. 
PoMMier, “La résolution du conflit de lois en matière contractuelle en présence d'une élection de droit: le róle de l'arbitre”, JDI 
Clunet, 1992, pp. 5-44; l.G. rAdiCATi di Brozolo, “Arbitrage commercial international et lois de police: considérations sur les 
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B) Article VII.1 of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, made in 
Geneva on April 21, 1961
30. Art. VII.1 of the Convention recites: “The parties shall be free to determine, by agreement, 
the law to be applied by the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute. Failing any indication by the 
parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrators shall apply the proper law under the rule of conflict 
that the arbitrators deem applicable. In both cases the arbitrators shall take account of the terms of the 
contract and trade usages.”63. This provision, despite its apparent simplicity, is actually a hornets’ nest. 
The provision establishes two connecting factors, structured in cascade.
31.The provision does not specify whether the parties in order to regulate their contract must 
choose the Law of a State or a non-national legal regulation. However, the letter of art. VII.1 Geneva 
Convention 1961, which refers expressly to a “Law”, seems more inclined to admit that the parties can 
only choose the legal system of a State as “Law applicable to the substance of the dispute”, as M. GóMez 
Jene points out64. Once the application of a specific national Law is determined, such Law is applicable 
in its entirety, that is to say, including the International Agreements and other international regulations 
that are in force in that State. Consequently, the parties can only exclude the application of a particular 
international agreement when that is allowed by the national law applicable to the substance of the dis-
pute (vid. arts. 1 and 6 CISG 1980) (J.C. fernández rozAs)65.
32. In the event that the parties failed to choose a Law or set of rules to resolve the substance of 
their dispute, the arbitrators will apply the proper Law in accordance with the rule of conflict that the ar-
bitrators deem appropriate in the case in question. Art. VII.1 Geneva Convention 1961 follows, therefo-
re, a “conflictual approach”: the arbitrators are to apply the national Law indicated by a rule of conflict, 
and cannot directly apply a special material rule to resolve the dispute, unlike what is established ¾in 
the case of Spain¾  by art. 34 of the Spanish Arbitration Law 2003. However, this second connecting 
factor is extremely complex, for several reasons.
33. The provision does not specify whether such “proper law under the rule of conflict that the 
arbitrators deem applicable” should be an existing “national conflict rule”, or they are free to “create” 
an ad hoc conflict rule that seems appropriate for the case in question or for international commercial 
arbitration in general. The letter of the provision does not prevent the arbitrators from developing an ad 
hoc conflict rule. Now, “speculating” with the Law applicable to the substance of the case is not accep-
table. The arbitrators cannot apply a rule of conflict that they have selected at their whim: they must use 
a conflict rule with quality connecting factors, which lead to the application of a law that is predictable 
conflits de juridictions dans le commerce international”, RCADI, 2005, t. 315, pp. 265-501; id., “El rol del Derecho en el arbitraje 
internacional”, en Liber amicorum Angelo Davì: La vita giuridica internazionale nell’età della globalizzazione, vol. III, Napoli, 
Editoriale Scientifica, 2019, pp. 2003-2013; f. rAGno, “Norme di applicazione necessaria come limite all’accesso alla giustizia 
arbitrale internazionale?”, en Liber amicorum Angelo Davì: La vita giuridica internazionale nell’età della globalizzazione, vol. 
III, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2019, pp. 2015-2036; A. redfern / M. hunTer, Law and Practice of International Commer-
cial Arbitratíon, 2ª ed., London, 1991, pp. 70-128; s. sánChez lorenzo, “Derecho aplicable al fondo de la controversia en el 
arbitraje comercial internacional”, REDI, LXI, 1, 2009, pp. 39-74; K.J. sChiffer, Normen ausländischen “öffentlichen” Rechts 
in internationalen Handelsschiedsverfahren, Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München, Heymann, 1990; l. silBerMAn/f. ferrAri, “Getting 
to the law applicable to the merits in international arbitration and the consequences of getting it wrong”, in f. ferrAri/s. Kröll 
(eds.), Conflict of laws in international arbitration, München, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2011, pp. 257-324; w. TeTleY, 
“Arbitration and the choice of Law”, Europ.Transport Law, 1993, pp. 149-179; A.n. zhilsov, “Mandatory and Public Policy 
Rules in International Commercial Arbitration”, NILR, 42, 1, 1995, pp. 81-119.
63  European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, made in Geneva on 21 April 1961 (BOE [Spanish Offi-
cial Journal] No. 238 of 4 October 1975). Vid., G. zeiler/A. siwY (eds.), The European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration: a commentary, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International B.V., 2019.
64  M. GóMez Jene, Arbitraje comercial internacional, Madrid, Ed. Civitas, 2018, p. 334.
65  J.C. fernández rozAs, Ius Mercatorum (autorregulación y unificación del Derecho de los negocios transnacionales, 
Madrid, Colegios Notariales de España, 2003; id., “Lex Mercatoria y autonomía conflictual en la contratación internacional”, 
AEDIP, 2004, pp. 35-78; id., “Alternativa conflictual o material en la búsqueda de un Derecho contractual europeo más cohe-
rente”, La Ley, 28 febrero 2005, No. 6199.
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for the parties; a law whose application to the case leads to reduced conflict costs because it fits with 
the “legal expectations of the parties” (P. frAnzinA)66. Consequently, it seems appropriate to say that the 
arbitrators should apply, if possible, a national conflict rule, since it is easier for the parties to predict the 
application of a law designated by a national conflict rule –which can be consulted beforehand– rather 
than the application of a national Law designated by a conflict rule that does not exist and that the arbi-
trators must “build” in the arbitration proceedings. 
34. Once ascertained that in principle the arbitrators must apply a national conflict rule, but 
cannot and should not “speculate” with such conflict rule, it must be admitted that the arbitrators cannot 
resort to “any” rule of conflict: they must apply the one whose application is most predictable for the 
parties. Among such conflict rules, the following may be mentioned:
First, the national conflict rules of the State in which the arbitral tribunal has its seat, as proposed 
in art. 11 Resolution IDI Amsterdam session, whenever it is possible to concretize a “seat of arbitration” 
(P. fouChArd, B. GoldMAn)67. This thesis is currently outdated, as P. frAnzinA points out, because there 
may be another conflict rule more appropriate than that of the country seat of arbitration, especially if 
two companies based in a country resolve their dispute by arbitration in another country68.
Second, in the event of a private international arbitration that results from an international con-
tract, the conflict rule of the country whose material Law has been designated by the parties to govern 
the contract ¾provided that the parties have chosen the Law or the rules applicable to their contract¾ or 
the conflict rule of the country whose Law governs the legal relationship that caused the private inter-
national arbitration69.
Third, the conflict rule of the country of habitual residence or common seat of the parties, pro-
vided that such circumstances concur in the specific case.
Fourth, and for the case in which the parties have their habitual residence or establishment in di-
fferent States, the conflict rule of such countries may apply, provided that they are identical or very similar.
Fifth, in complex cases, the practice often resorts to the well-known technique of “False Con-
flict”: the arbitrators examine the national laws connected with the case, and if they observe that they 
give the same or similar solution to the case, they apply both Laws or they provide the solution without 
indicating which national law they actually applied (h.A. GriGerA nAón)70.
35. In cases where it is difficult to identify a single conflict rule whose application in the event 
of arbitration is predictable for the parties, the arbitrators may resort to the application of a conflict rule 
created by the arbitrators themselves and extracted from the “general principles of private international 
law”. Such general principles are those generally accepted by the different state systems of private inter-
national law and by the legal instruments of uniform law71. The famous arbitral award of May 15, 1963, 
Cavin: “the connecting factors used in doctrine and in case law”) was rendered applying this method72. 
In this sense, some of the technical mechanisms included in the Rome I Regulation of June 17, 2008 
66  P. frAnzinA, “I conflitti di leggi davanti agli arbitri del commercio internazionale: note in tema di collegamento obiettivo 
alla luce del Regolamento Roma I”, CDT, 2009-II, pp. 328-338;
67  Annuaire, 1952, t. 11, p. 484. P. fouChArd, “Introduction: spécificité de l'arbitrage international”, Rev.Arb., 1981, pp. 449-
468; B. GoldMAn, “Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria”, Archives de Philosolophie du droit, vol. 9, 1964, pp. 46-69; id., “La lex 
mercatoria dans les contrats et l'arbitrage international: réalités et perspectives”, JDI Clunet, 1979, vol. 106, pp. 475508; id., “Les 
conflits de lois dans l'arbitrage international de droit privé”, RCADI, 1963, vol. 109, p. 368.
68  P. frAnzinA, “I conflitti di leggi davanti agli arbitri del comercio internazionale: note in tema di collegamento obiettivo 
alla luce del Regolamento Roma I”, CDT, 2009-II, pp. 328-338;
69  f.e. Klein, “La Convention européenne sur l'arbitrage commercial international”, RCDIP, 1962, pp. 621-640.
70  h.A. GriGerA nAón, Choice-of-law Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, Tübingen, Mohr, 1992; h.A. 
GriGerA nAón, “Choice-of-Law Problems in international commercial arbitration”, RCADI, 2001, vol. 289, pp. 9-396.
71  Vid., ad ex., s.M. CArBone, “Dalla specialità e prevalenza del diritto uniforme alla sua integrazione nello spazio giudiziario 
europeo”, in Liber amicorum Antonio Tizzano: de la Cour CECA à la Cour de l'Union: le long parcours de la justice européenne, 
Torino, Giappichelli, 2018, pp. 170-178; P. KAhn, “Les príncipes généraux du droit devant les arbitres du commerce internatio-
nal”, JDI Clunet, 1989, pp. 305-327; f. osMAn, Les principes généraux de la lex mercatoria: contribution à l’étude d’un ordre 
juridique anational, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1992.
72  ICLQ, 1964, p. 1011.
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can be considered as instruments that express a general methodological consensus on how to accredit 
the “centre of gravity of the legal relationship” 73. In this perspective, certain provisions of the Rome I 
Regulation, insofar as they express such general principles of private international law, can serve the 
arbitrators to construct a conflict rule that determines the law applicable to the substance of the dispute: 
exception clause, application of the Law of the country of residence of the seller, preference for the Law 
of habitual residence over the national Law of the parties, etc.
36. It is also true that, as underlined by M. GóMez Jene, said art. VII.1 allows the application of 
the New Lex Mercatoria to the substance of the case in the event that the conflict rules applied by the 
arbitrator allow him to select the New Lex Mercatoria ¾in any of its approaches or versions¾ as the law 
governing the dispute74.
37. The reference to trade usages made by art. VII.1 Geneva Convention 1961 is imprecise and 
its scope is confused, undefined and ambiguous. It is doubtful if such reference contemplates “trade 
usages” as a true “independent legal system”, or as a mere manifestation of “material party autonomy” 
within a given national Law. Now, it seems reasonable to understand that such reference covers trade 
usages to which the parties have referred apart from any national legislation (= incorporated by referen-
ce to the contract by the parties), as well as the application of trade usages so widespread in the commer-
cial sector in question, that the parties could not ignore them (= objective trade usages whose application 
cannot be ignored by parties that operate in good faith in an international arbitration).
C) Art. 34.2 of Spanish Arbitration Law 60/2003
a) Open attitude of the legislator toward non-national legal materials
38. In cases not regulated by the aforementioned Geneva Convention of 1961, if the arbitration 
is carried out in Spain, art. 34.2 of the Spanish Arbitration Law 60/2003, of December 23, applies75. The 
provision provides that: “without prejudice to the provisions of the previous paragraph, in the event of an 
international arbitration, the arbitrators shall resolve the dispute in accordance with the legal norms cho-
sen by the parties. It will be understood that any indication of the law or legal system of a given State ¾un-
less otherwise stated¾ refers to the substantive law of that State and not to its conflict rules. If the parties 
do not indicate the applicable legal norms, the arbitrators will apply those that they deem appropriate”.
Paragraph 3 of art. 34 of Spanish Arbitration Law 60/2003, of December 23, moreover, recites: 
“in any case, the arbitrators will decide according to the terms of the contract and will take account of 
the applicable usages”. This reference must be object of a “specific reading”: it refers, as M. GóMez Jene 
indicates again, to those usages that are not part of the New Lex Mercatoria, but that have acquired the 
range of legally binding practices for the key players of international trade76. Article 34.2 of Arbitration 
Law does not specify when a usage is “applicable to a given case”. It must be understood that such usages 
shall apply when they are widely known within the trade community and commercial sector concerned, 
so that no merchant can ignore them.
As for the allusion made by art. 34.2 Arbitration Law 60/2003 to the “terms of the contract” it 
seems paradoxical as well as surprising: it is not easy to find a judge or arbitrator who does not take into 
account the clauses of a contract object of the dispute about which he is resolving.
73  Regulation (EC) Nº 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ EU 2008 Nº L 177, p. 6. Vid., ad ex., A.-l. CAlvo CArAvACA/J. CArrAsCosA González/C. 
CAAMiñA doMínGuez, Litigación internacional en la Unión Europea II. La Ley aplicable a los contratos internacionales. Co-
mentario al Reglamento Roma I, Cizur Menor, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2017; u. MAGnus/P. MAnKowsKi (Eds.), Rome I 
Regulation, Köln, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2017.
74  M. GóMez Jene, Arbitraje comercial internacional, Madrid, Ed. Civitas, 2018, p. 334.
75  BOE [Spanish Official Journal] no. 309 of 26 December 2003.
76  M. GóMez Jene, Arbitraje comercial internacional, Madrid, Ed. Civitas, 2018, p. 336.
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The preamble (VII) of Law 60/2003, of December 23, explains the scope of these provisions 
and their leit-motiv: “3.) Following the trend of the most advanced legal systems, the requirement that 
the applicable law must be related to the legal relationship or to the controversy is suppressed, since 
it is a requirement whose boundaries are blurred and that is difficult to control. 4.) The law prefers the 
expression ‘applicable legal rules’ to ‘applicable law’, insofar as the latter seems to encompass the 
requirement of referral to the legal system of a State, when in some cases the rules to be applied belong 
to several different legal systems or are common rules of international trade. 5.) The law does bind the 
arbitrators to a system of conflict rules”.
b) Choice of the New Lex Mercatoria by the parties
39. An analysis of this provision gives rise to several elements of interest to build a metacriti-
cism regarding the shortcomings of the orthodox theory of the New Lex Mercatoria as the system gover-
ning international contracts in an international arbitration scenario.
40. The legal rules that arbitrators must apply to the substance of the matter at hand in private 
international arbitration are, first of all, the “legal rules chosen by the parties”. Note that the rule does 
not obligate the parties to choose a national “Law”. It merely refers to “legal rules”. As a consequence, 
in private international arbitration proceedings the parties can choose the national Law of a State as the 
Law governing the merits of the dispute, and they can also choose the “conflict of Laws” rules of a given 
State legal system (P. lAGArde / A. TenenBAuM)77.
41. However, the provision also contemplates that the parties choose non-national legal systems 
for the arbitrators to resolve the merits of the dispute, such as the New Lex Mercatoria itself, or the 2010 
Unidroit Principles. Indeed, art. 34 of Spanish Arbitration Law 2003 expressly authorizes the parties to 
make such a choice. On this possibility, certain observations can be made.
42. A first observation reveals that the parties can choose as the governing law of the substance 
of the case, a legal system independent of any national law, really international, created and guarded 
by arbitrators, who keep formulating it in a praetorian manner by means of their arbitral awards. Such 
legal system revolves around the so-called New Lex Mercatoria (Lex Mercatoria or Jus Mercatorum or 
Nundinarum). The parties may choose, as applicable to the substance of the dispute, certain materials 
that are not part of any “national legal systems”, but merely sets of rules or patterns of behaviour that 
are not systematically structured. This group of materials should include the General Principles of Law, 
international trade usages, the Codes of Conduct, specific international conventions, model Laws or 
uniform Laws, the New Lex Mercatoria itself and other fuzzy materials specific to dispute resolution.
43. A second observation reveals that, in relation to so-called “semi-international” contracts (= 
contracts made between a State and a foreign company, whose object usually is the lease or concession 
of a public good or service), the States understandably do not wish to be subject to the Law of another 
State78. It is, therefore, logical and admissible to seek “non-national regulations” such as ¾for instance¾ 
the “general principles of Law recognized by civilized Nations”, that arbitrators will apply to resolve the 
disputes that may be submitted to them.
44. The third observation makes it clear that oftentimes the reference made by the parties in 
favour of “non-national law” is mere wishful thinking because such “legal systems”, like the New Lex 
Mercatoria, are fragmentary, incomplete, imprecise sets of rules, full of loopholes and made up of doc-
trines extracted from arbitral awards that more often than not have not been published (M.J. hunTer, P. 
77  P. lAGArde / A. TenenBAuM, “De la Convention de Rome au Règlement Rome I”, RCDIP, 2008, pp. 727-780.
78  J.-f. lAlive, “Contrats entre États ou entreprises étatiques et personnes privées. Développements récents”, RCADI, 1983-
III, vol. 181, pp. 2-284.
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sAnders) or reasoned79. In other cases, the arbitrators claim to have based their decision on the New Lex 
Mercatoria, but that is not entirely true: they have made their decision based on the content of various 
national laws, from which they actually took the applicable rules.
  
45. Fourth, it might be highlighted that, from a procedural point of view, the achievement of a 
“de-nationalized arbitration” (= rendered through the application of the New Lex Mercatoria) may end 
up being a Pyrrhic victory due to the so-called “Norsolor syndrome”80. This occurs when the courts of 
the country where it has been rendered consider that the award is not a “national” award, but a “foreign” 
award precisely because it was rendered pursuant to non-national regulations. In this case, and given that 
it is a foreign award, the courts may consider inadmissible an appeal that can only be granted against 
national awards81.
46. Fifth, it must be recalled that, in principle, under the New York Convention of June 10, 1958, 
an exequatur cannot be denied to a foreign arbitral award merely because the arbitrators applied the New 
Lex Mercatoria instead of a national law to the merits of the controversy.
47. Sixth, certain authors have defended that it is possible for the arbitrators to admit the appli-
cation of the New Lex Mercatoria as a result of the so-called “implied negative choice of the parties”. 
This phenomenon occurs when the parties have not chosen any specific national Law. This fact is usua-
lly interpreted by the arbitral tribunal as a rejection to apply the Law of the country where the parties 
have their seat and as a mandate that the contract should not be governed by any of the parties’ national 
law. In this case, certain arbitrators have resorted to the direct application of the New Lex Mercatoria 
(ICC Award n. 7375 / 1996, Westinghouse)82.
48. Seventh, finally, the tendency in favour of an arbitration whose controversy is decided by 
the application of “rules of law” that may be non-national is clear, as illustrated by u. drAeTTA in France 
(vid. Judgment Cour de Cassation, October 13, 1981, Judgment Cour de Cassation, France, October 
22, 1991), Italy (Judgment Corte di Cassazione, Italy, February 8, 1982), United Kingdom, (Judgment 
Court of Appeal, England, March 24, 1987, and Switzerland (vid. article 187 Private International Law 
Act 18 December 1987: “Il tribunale arbitrale decide la controversia secondo il diritto scelto dalle parti 
o, in subordine, secondo il diritto con cui la fattispecie è più strettamente connessa”: i.e. “The arbitral 
tribunal resolves the dispute in accordance with the Law chosen by the parties or, subordinately, in ac-
cordance with the Law with which the case is most closely connected”)83.
79  P. sAnders, “Trends in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration”, RCADI, 1975, vol.145, pp. 227-235; id., “L'ar-
bitrage dans les transactions commerciales à long terme”, Rev. Arb., 1975, pp. 83-87; id., “Aspects de l'arbitrage international”, 
RDIDC, 1976, pp. 133-135; A. redfern / M. hunTer, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed., Lon-
don, 1991, pp. 70-128.
80  Sentencia del Tribunal de apelación de París de 9 diciembre 1980, Societé Aksa vs. societé Norsolor, texto en RCDIP, 
1981, pp. 545-550, y nota de e. MezGer; e. GAillArd, Aspects philosophiques du droit de l'arbitrage international, Leiden, 
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, pp. 191-193; B. GoldMAn, “Une bataille judiciaire autour de la ‘lex mercatoria’. 
L'affaire Norsolor”, Rev.Arb., 1983, pp. 379-409.
81  l. MisTelis, “Delocalization and its Relevance in Post-Award Review”, in f. BAChAnd & f. GélinAs (eds.), The UNCI-
TRAL Model Law after 25 Years: Global Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration, Huntington, New York, Juris-
Net, LLC, 2013, pp. 167-181; J. PAulsson, “Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters”, 
ICLQ, 32, 1, 1983, pp. 53-61; P. reAd, “Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration: Its Relevance in the New Mil-
lennium”, The American Review of International Arbitration, 10, 2, 1999, pp. 177-201; z. sAGhir/n. ChrisPAs, “Delocalisation 
in International Commercial Arbitration: A Theory in Need of Practical”, International Company and Commercial Law Review, 
27, 8, 2016, pp. 269-276.
82  Vid. the text or, at least, a part of this one in UNILEX (www.unilex.info) and also in Measley's International Arbitration 
Report, 11, 1996, pp. A-1 to A-69 (original in English) and Uniform Law Review / Revue de droit uniforme, 1997, pp. 598-599 
(abstract in English and French). Vid., ad ex., J.C. fernández rozAs, “Lex Mercatoria y autonomía conflictual en la contra-
tación internacional”, AEDIP, 2004, pp. 35-78; id., “Declive del método de atribución en la determinación por el árbitro del 
Derecho aplicable al fondo de la controversia”, Arbitraje, vol. III, nº 2, 2010, pp. 377-409.
83  u. drAeTTA, “La giurisprudenza francese conferma il carattere di regole di diritto della lex mercatoria (Cassation civil, 
22 ottobre 1991, n.1354)”, DCI, 1992, vol.VI, pp. 214-227.
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c) Application of the New Lex Mercatoria in the absence of a choice of law by the parties
49. In the event that the parties have not given any indication on the “applicable legal rules” 
to resolve the merits of the dispute, the arbitrators will apply the “rules they deem appropriate”. In this 
sense, the arbitrators are not bound by a specific conflict rule, neither Spanish nor foreign, nor are they 
bound by a specific substantive Law, neither Spanish nor foreign. The arbitrators are not the “guardians” 
of the Law of any given State. When selecting the regulations applicable to the merits of the case, the 
arbitrators are not bound to previously apply a conflict rule that determines which is the law governing 
the substance of the case, unlike what is established by the European Convention on International Com-
mercial Arbitration, made in Geneva on April 21, 1961 in the cases regulated by said agreement. In fact, 
in such cases, the aforementioned Convention binds the arbitrators to always apply a conflict rule prior 
to specifying the substantive regulations applicable to the merits of the case.
50. Consequently, in the context of art. 34.2 of Spanish Arbitration Law, the arbitrators may 
apply to the substance of the dispute: (a) A national conflict rule, which they deem most appropriate 
for designating the applicable national Law most easily predictable for the parties; (b) A conflict rule 
created by the arbitrators themselves due to the complexity of the particular case, which will designate 
a substantive national Law applicable to the merits of the controversy; (c) A substantive national regu-
lation determined without the need to previously apply a conflict rule. This implies the application of a 
national law by “voie directe”, in the words of Y. derAins, a Law selected without going through any 
conflict rule84; (d) A non-national regulation that allows the controversy to be adequately resolved, such 
as the 2010 Unidroit Principles on International Commercial Contracts, specific rules of the New Lex 
Mercatoria, international trade usages, general principles of Law, etc.; (e) A body of rules formed by a 
combination of legal rules drawn from national legislation and/or non-national regulations. The arbitra-
tors may divide the legal relationship and submit the different parts to different national or non-national 
laws, which is known as the arbitral dépeçage of the contract or the legal relationship in question. 
IV. Concluding thoughts. New Lex Mercatoria, regulatory competence and efficiency principle
51. Private international law, both national and European, has established a cardinal principle in 
the field of international trade in general and international contracts in particular: the free choice of appli-
cable regulations. Such principle proper to litigation in international business shows an undeniable tenden-
cy to expand. This leads both the European and Spanish legislator to admit the possibility for the parties of 
choosing non-national regulations to govern and settle such disputes. This can be observed in art. 34 of the 
Spanish Arbitration Law and in art. VII.1 of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbi-
tration, made in Geneva on April 21, 1961. Party autonomy taken as a general regulating principle of the 
international legal relationships between individuals, as A. hellGArdT points out, leads to admit  –under 
different technical formulas– that the parties can resort to the New Lex Mercatoria as a regulation appli-
cable to international trade85. It is not necessary, needless to say, that such regulations, including the New 
Lex Mercatoria, operate as Lex Contractus. In fact, it is not about admitting a contract without Law and 
a Law without State; it is about accepting that such materials can be applied to the relationships between 
individuals involved in international trade and used to resolve the conflicts that may arise. 
52. The expansion of the autonomy of individuals, which favours the application of the New Lex 
Mercatoria to international business, operates without restrictions in the relationships between compa-
84  Y. derAins, “Les normes d'application immédiate dans la jurisprudence arbitrale internationale”, Mélanges B.Goldman, 
Paris, Litec, 1983, pp. 29-49. Also P. lAlive, “Les règles de conflits de lois appliquées au fond du litige par l’arbitre internatio-
nal siégeant en Suisse”, Revue de l’arbitrage, 1976, p. 155; s. sánChez lorenzo, “Derecho aplicable al fondo de la controversia 
en el arbitraje comercial internacional”, REDI, LXI, 1, 2009, pp. 39-74, esp. p. 55.
85  A. hellGArdT, “Das Verbot der kollisionsrechtlichen Wahl nichtstaatlichen Rechts und das Unionsgrundrecht der Priva-
tautonomie”, RabelsZ, 2018-3, pp. 654-696.
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nies. As P. MAnKowsKi remarks, commercial relationships is the only one sector in which the choice of 
applicable regulations really is free86. In this context, normative autonomy of the companies helps to 
build ¾in a way parallel to Public International Law¾ a regulating structure for the efficient organiza-
tion of international business. And efficiency is a global value that contributes to the welfare progress of 
companies and societies, as v. ruiz ABou-niGM / K. MCCAll-sMiTh / d. frenCh have observed87. This 
leads to demystifying the value of uniform law. Given the multipolar structure of the world, T. Kono 
points out, uniform Law may be inefficient whereas the application of the New Lex Mercatoria may be 
efficient88. The New Lex Mercatoria may allow the application of a regulation more in accordance with 
the needs of the parties or the dispute.
53. The limiting factors that affect national courts, which are tied to rigid, closed and self-con-
tained normative systems, do not affect arbitrators. In international cases, connected with several States 
and sectors, arbitrators can operate with multiple regulations that make up a pool of rules that allow ex-
tracting the best of each regulation. As indicated by e.A. Posner / J.C. Yoo, the orthodox thesis (= “the 
conventional wisdom”), which considers that state courts are “independent” and therefore decide with 
more justice while arbitrators are “partial” and therefore decide with less justice, should be reviewed89. 
In this line, it can be argued that the arbitrators defend justice with greater emphasis in international 
trade relationships. The arbitrators operate in a market of adjudicators and must earn their own prestige, 
on which their future selection as arbitrator depends. Thus, arbitrators do not hesitate to seek and select 
the best rules to resolve the dispute, and do not falter if such rules have to be extracted from the New 
Lex Mercatoria. As indicated by the authors cited above, “the most successful tribunals are dependent”.
54. On the other hand it is fair to admit, with l. de AlMeidA, that the lack of a universal model 
of Private Law leads to recognize that a worldwide market tends to create rules that are independent of 
the States90. It is the “transnationalization, Globalization and europanization of private Law”. The fall 
of the codified private law myth corresponds to the rise of the New Lex Mercatoria as a conflict-solving 
method between companies. In this approach, the New Lex Mercatoria, along the lines suggested by P. 
elefTheriAdis, contributes to the achievement of truly international and cosmopolitan objectives distant 
from the interests of the States, which notoriously tend to regulate selfishly, favouring their national 
and state interests91. The New Lex Mercatoria places companies on a level of equal value and only the 
arbitrators are in the best position to apply a neutral law that does not benefit one party or another only 
because it belongs to one State or another.
55. At present, the international society of economic operators is a global society in which ever-
yone takes part. This post-national society, lacking an authority capable of elaborating and promulgating 
a post-national law regulating international business, does have a set of adjudicators that operate in ac-
cordance with rules of variable geometry. They are the arbitrators, the creative players of international 
business law. The arbitrators, as f. GAlGAno underlines, can use the New Lex Mercatoria not as an alter-
native system to the Law of the States, but as a method for the prevention and solution of international 
conflicts between companies92. Arbitrators, thus, can create a crucible of “reasonable rules of behaviour” 
86  P. MAnKowsKi, “Just how free is a free choice of law in contract in the EU?”, Journal of Private International Law, vol. 
13, 2017, pp. 231-258.
87  v. ruiz ABou-niGM / K. MCCAll-sMiTh / d. frenCh, Linkages and Boundaries in Private and Public International Law, 
Oxford, London, Hart Publishing, 2018, pp. 12-19.
88  T. Kono, “Efficiency in Private International Law”, RCADI, vol. 369, 2014, pp. 361-502.
89  e.A. Posner / J.C. Yoo, “A Theory of International Adjudication”, John M. Olin Law & Economics Research Paper 
Series Working Paper No. 206 / Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 146, 2018, available 
in: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.
90  l. de AlMeidA, “Rise and fall of the classic concept of private law: lessons from the legal consciousness of European 
private law”, DESC - Direito, Economia e Sociedade Contemporânea, vol. 1, n. 1, pp. 95-128, and Jul/Dez 2018, pp. 96-128.
91  P. elefTheriAdis, “The moral distinctiveness of the European Union”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 
9, no. 3-4, 2011, pp. 695-713.
92  f. GAlGAno, “Globalizzazione dei mercati e universalità del diritto”, Politica del diritto, 2009-2, pp. 177-192.
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that stimulate trade and exchange, the source of welfare of the world. Through the use of the New Lex 
Mercatoria as a method of selecting the applicable rules, they can generate a set of efficient rules. The 
New Lex Mercatoria is presented, just as in the past good old Roman Law, which was rediscovered in 
the late Middle Ages, as an “independent law of the political constitution”, as u. MAnThe illustrates93.
56. The New Lex Mercatoria as a method of selection of the regulatory rules in international 
trade is thus an expression of the self-regulation of traders on a planetary level. Multiform and multi-
polar, the New Lex Mercatoria method in the hands of the arbitrators can operate as an instrument for 
the selection of the best legal rules and therefore, contribute to the progress of law. In this scenario, it 
must be kept in mind that there is an unquestionable principle in the regulation of international legal 
relationships between companies and traders: respect for the common will of the parties in a specific 
legal relationship. In this sense, as highlighted above, the arbitrator must apply the legal materials that 
the parties have chosen. In the absence of such choice, the will of the parties must also be respected. The 
contract constitutes the highest expression of the agreement of the parties. The arbitrator operates within 
such legal boundaries. Therefore, when the parties have indicated that the arbitrator must apply the New 
Lex Mercatoria to resolve the dispute or have not indicated anything at all, the arbitrator must carry out 
his work of identification and selection of the materials that constitute the New Lex Mercatoria with 
maximum compliance with the will of the parties. In this sense, the arbitrator must estimate that the New 
Lex Mercatoria is made up of the usages, practices, principles and other legal materials that constitute 
undoubted, habitual, real and manifest usages of the commercial sector in question. These undoubted 
usages are objective rules on whose existence and practical application there is an indisputable, true, 
incontrovertible, manifest, obvious and safe commercial consensus.
 In this way, s. sánChez lorenzo explains, these materials become a normative set with a flexi-
ble composition that reflects the tacit will of the parties. They constitute the objective crystallization of 
the will of the merchants who operate in a specific economic sector94. This allows distilling a commer-
cial justice of quality, far from the Cadies Courts or Praetorian Law, which were merely the will of a 
particular arbitrator. An efficient trade justice, because the established rules that have been translated 
into indisputable legal usage constitute, by definition, the best possible rules, that is, the most efficient 
solutions that regulate the legal relationships proper to international trade.
Rome, May 8, 2019
93  u. MAnThe, Storia del diritto romano, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2010, pp. 133-139.
94  s. sánChez lorenzo, “Derecho aplicable al fondo de la controversia en el arbitraje comercial internacional”, REDI, LXI, 
1, 2009, pp. 39-74.
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